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FIT BY ADAPTATION OR FIT BY FOUNDING? A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
EXISTING AND NEW ENTREPRENEURIAL COHORTS IN CHINA 
Abstract 
Extant research provides ambiguous views on the network adaptability of existing ventures and new 
ventures during environmental change. Applying an institutional perspective, this research aims to 
provide a clearer picture by comparing the adaptation and network configurations of existing vs new 
entrepreneurial cohorts during China’s institutional change after 1992. The qualitative and 
quantitative analyses show that the existing cohort of entrepreneurs display network inertia, in that 
they largely maintain strong tie–based political and market networks; the new cohort instead 
demonstrate better adaptation by establishing fewer political networks but more weak and diverse 
market networks. This comparative research unpacks the institutional mechanisms underlying such 
differences, and serves as a ground for future investigations dealing with the strategic actions of 
different entrepreneurial cohorts that are largely neglected in previous studies. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Much research has highlighted the importance of networks to venture success (Ahuja, Soda, and 
Zaheer, 2012; Gulati and Nohria, 2000). Network ties aid in the acquisition of knowledge and 
resources and may also confer legitimacy to new ventures, which are in general disadvantaged in 
resources and legitimacy. In transitional economies like China, the very idea of entrepreneurial 
venturing had, for a long period of time, suffered from lack of legitimacy and disadvantaged access 
to resources. It was therefore important for entrepreneurs in the early period of reform to establish 
networks based on strong−ties to substitute for the weak regulative institutional support in early 
period (Xin and Pearce, 1996).  
Like other strategies taken to enhance venture performance, however, the ways in which 
ventures leverage networks may exhibit inertia, even as changing environmental conditions call for 
different strategies (Koka, Madhavan, and Prescott, 2006). The organizational imprinting literature 
has shown in general that founders’ formative experiences in specific organizational environments 
have lasting effects on their subsequent behaviors (Burton and Beckman, 2007; Phillips, 2005). In 
particular, the network imprinting literature suggests that initial network structures continue to have 
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lasting effects long after the conditions under which they were established have long since changed 
(Marquis, 2003). Research has documented the phenomenon of socialist imprinting in countries 
undergoing extensive and prolonged economic transition (Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006). 
Organizational practices and mentalities were slow to change, even as they grew out of fit with new 
environmental conditions. But while much is known about why and how entrepreneurs leveraged 
networks in the early stages of economic transition, little is known about whether and how 
entrepreneurs adapted their networks after the institutional conditions that motivated the formation 
of these networks had changed (Hitt et al., 2004; Peng and Quan, 2009; Peng and Zhou, 2005).  
We therefore investigate how pre-existing and new entrepreneurs construct and adapt their 
network configurations to fit the changing institutional environment. In particular, we focus on 
understanding the underlying processes and mechanisms that lead to differences in entrepreneurs’ 
network configurations. We study two cohorts of entrepreneurs in Shanghai, a site of massive 
institutional change (Huang, 2008: 174). The first cohort founded their businesses at the beginning 
of China’s market-oriented reform period, while the second founded their businesses after market-
oriented reforms had been well-established. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal 
evidence of network inertia within the early-stage cohort. Entrepreneurs that founded their 
businesses in the early stage of market reform were prone to adopting a network−deepening strategy, 
leading them to maintain political and market networks that were based on strong ties and lacked 
diversity. In contrast, entrepreneurs in the late-stage cohort tended to adopt a network−broadening 
strategy, establishing fewer political networks but more weak and diverse market networks.  
Our study contributes to understanding how entrepreneurs construct and adapt network 
configurations to fit changing institutional environments (Peli, 2009). Our findings show that 
institutional conditions at founding affect entrepreneurs’ network actions—i.e. how they create, use 
and develop ties (Jack, 2010)—and that these networking actions can exhibit inertia even after 
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institutional changes cause them to become maladaptive. Our study therefore extends recent research 
on the implications of network-deepening and network-broadening among entrepreneurs (e.g. Vissa, 
2012) by showing how institutional conditions shape entrepreneurs’ uses of these networking actions. 
This contributes, more generally, to understanding the processes and mechanisms through which 




The organizational imprinting literature shows that experiences from past organizational 
environments continue to have lasting effects on subsequent organizational structure. For instance, 
Phillips (2005) finds that prior experience at parent firms leads founders to institute similar routines 
in their newly-founded law firms. Hallen (2008) shows that founders’ pre-existing personal networks 
are converted to organizational ties at their newly-founded firms. McEvily and colleagues (2012) 
find that lawyers’ early-career ties to mentors at other firms continue to enhance the growth of their 
current law firms. An implied consequence of imprinting is that organizational structures may 
continue to reflect environmental conditions of the past, even if organizations’ environments have 
since changed. For instance, Marquis (2003) finds that corporations in older communities 
established before the advent of air travel continue to have more geographically-localized director 
networks, even long after travel time ceased to be a binding constraint.  
The role of institutional imprinting is likely to be particularly important in the context of 
transition economies. Research on networks in transitional economies suggests that close networks 
established in early periods to cope with uncertainty can impede firms from exploring diverse new 
resources and opportunities. In particular, entrepreneurs and firms are thought to shift from strong 
to weak tie−based networks (Peng and Zhou, 2005), to establish fewer political ties but more market 
ties, and to diversify connections (Hitt et al., 2004; Peng and Quan, 2009; Peng and Zhou, 2005). 
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However, this adaptation may be difficult for existing ventures and entrepreneurs because socialist 
imprinting inhibits their adaptation to new market conditions (Kogut and Zander, 2000; Kriauciunas 
and Kale, 2006), and strong interpersonal networks established to cope with difficulties during the 
socialist period still persist (Ledeneva, 1998; Sedaitis, 1998). Compared to entrepreneurs that 
founded their businesses in the early stages of transition, entrepreneurs that founded their businesses 
later may be less constrained by imprinting.  
At the same time, however, new entrepreneurs may also be subject to the liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965) and lack the advantage of established networks. Research shows that, to 
increase their chances of survival, new organizations and firms tend to conform with long−lasting 
institutions (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983) and existing business community norms (Galaskiewicz 
and Wasserman, 1989), and emulate legitimated local templates (Marquis, 2003). In the Chinese 
context, the founders of new firms intensively establish guanxi (strong interpersonal relationships) 
with government officials and business partners (Li and Zhang, 2007) and also mimic existing 
routines and practices (e.g., affective interaction through wining and dining) of guanxi cultivation 
(Yang, 1994), despite the high financial and emotional cost.  
    In studying organizational renewal to the changing environment, Peli (2009) identifies two 
forms of population adjustment: incumbent organizations renew themselves and strategically adapt 
to the new environment, that is, fit by adaptation; new organization instead investigate whether they 
can align with the new conditions from their initiation, without referring to old social structures and 
enduring templates, that is, fit by founding. We extend this conceptual work to empirically examine 
how existing and new ventures adapt to the changing institutional conditions. Entrepreneurs in a 
transition economy face a tension between preserving the networks that have been survival-
enhancing in the past and building new networks that provide broader exposure to newer market 
opportunities. This tension makes economic transition a unique context for studying the interplay 
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between imprinting by past environmental conditions and adaptation to new ones.  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS  
Research setting 
As the ‘epitome’ of China’s socio−economic transition (Huang, 2008: 174), Shanghai offers a rich 
setting for studying how entrepreneurs that entered at different stages of institutional transition 
respond to the coexistence of traditional business culture (Chen and Chen, 2004; Luo, 2007) with 
new norms and values diffused during the period of transition toward a market economy (Peng, 
2003). Although institutional change is incremental, it is possible to demarcate different phases to 
examine how firms and entrepreneurs adapt their strategies (Tan, 2007; Tan and Tan, 2005). Scholars 
mainly divide China’s market−oriented institutional change and entrepreneurship development into 
three stages: 1978−1991, 1992−2001, and 2002 to present (Tan, 2007; Tan and Tan, 2005; Tsui, Bian, 
and Cheng, 2006; Yang and Li, 2008). China began its initial reform in 1978, but the period from 
1978 to 1991 was not optimal for comparison, because the hybrid nature of ownership during that 
period made it very difficult to identify private entrepreneurial behavior (Nee, 1992; Tan, 2002). 
Thus 1992–2001 (early stage of market−oriented transition) and 2002–present (deepening of market 
transitions) instead represent the two crucial phases of the development of Chinese private 
entrepreneurship. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s ‘southern tour’ reaffirmed policy support for the private 
economy. However, institutions remained weak (Xin and Pearce, 1996). In 2001 private 
entrepreneurs were admitted as members of the Communist Party of China, and China entered the 
World Trade Organization (Li and Yang, 2006; Tan, 2007; Tsui et al., 2006; Yang and Li, 2008). 
Thereafter, institutions became relatively better established, more policies and measurements aimed 
at promoting business venturing were initiated. A review of the history of Shanghai’s institutional 
change and development of private entrepreneurship confirms this two−phase division (Shanghai 
Private Economy Yearbook, 2003, 2008).  
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Sample  
In their conceptual model, Romanelli and Tushman (1986) propose that to study strategic change 
during an environmental shift, sampling organizational population cohorts should be based on their 
entrance period. We therefore sample two entrepreneurial cohorts, defined by their founding period. 
Cohort A (CA) consists of entrepreneurs who started their business during 1992–2001 (P1), whereas 
Cohort B (CB) contains entrepreneurs who started the business during 2002–2009 (P2).  
To control for age and stage variations (Hite and Hesterly, 2001), we selected respondents who 
started their businesses when they were between 20–35 years of age and whose firms had already 
undergone their emergent and growth stages (or at least early growth for CB). Following these 
criteria, we identified 33 respondents. They were all engaged in small− and medium−sized 
enterprises. The industrial involvement of the two entrepreneurial cohorts is congruent with the 
overall pattern of industrial development in Shanghai (Shanghai Private Economy Yearbook 2005).  
Data collection 
We conducted this study during May–October 2009. No available longitudinal data describe the 
network configurations of different entrepreneurial cohorts over two decades, so we collected these 
data retrospectively. Marsden (1990) warns that retrospective data suffers a selection bias, in that 
recent and strong ties tend to be reported more prominently. We employed several interview 
techniques and triangulated the qualitative and quantitative data to minimize this bias. The 
semi−structured interviews began with open−ended questions designed to elicit information about 
respondents’ venture history and their perceptions of the external environment. To yield more 
accurate information, we employed courtroom questioning and event−tracking interview techniques 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Huber and Power, 1985). For example, we asked what problems and pressures 
the respondents confronted during the start of their venture, how they resolved them, and to whom 
(or to which organization) they turned for help. All respondents referred to their networks. We 
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followed up with questions about how they established their networks and to identify the 
characteristics of network configurations. The interview questions were slightly adapted for the two 
cohorts, such that for CA, we focused on whether and why they adapted their networks during 
periods of institutional change, whereas for CB, the interview questions focused more on the current 
institutional period. In short, network data collection was closely linked to two cohorts’ specific 
business activities and the surrounding institutional environments.  
After the semi−structured interviews, we collected quantitative data using a name−generator 
method (Burt, 1992), which generally is limited to the five most important connections. Burt and 
Ronchi (1994) find that using this method reduces retrospective inaccuracies. Additionaly this 
method has been used in studying social network among Chinese entrepreneurs (Chen and Tan, 
2009). Therefore, we asked the respondents (the egos) to list a maximum of five names of others 
(the alters) who helped their venture during the institutional change (for CA, P1 and P2; for CB, 
only P2). Then we asked for information about the frequency of their communication, emotional 
closeness, alters’ backgrounds, and the type of help and its importance. These quantitative data 
facilitated a triangulation of the findings of the network configurations that emerged from the 
qualitative data and thus reduced the potential bias. The interviews were typically 90–120 minutes 
in length and were taped and transcribed verbatim. We followed up with calls to fill in some missing 
details. Excerpts of the interviews were translated from Chinese into English. 
Data analysis 
We adopted a systematic, constant comparison strategy (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and analyzed the 
qualitative data with Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis program. We embedded the quantitative data 
analysis into the three−step analysis process.  
First, we combined thematic and open coding to identify categories and examine the 
ego−centered network data. Thematic coding offers a good focus on the research questions (Ayres, 
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2008). We categorized respondents’ accounts of the environment into perceptions of regulative, 
cognitive, and normative institutions. We categorized three entrepreneurial processes (obtaining 
opportunities, accessing resources, and gaining legitimacy) to define how entrepreneurs construct 
their networks to achieve these goals. Through open coding, we identified codes, such as network 
dependence, network opportunities, network types, and so forth. During this step, differences 
between two cohorts’ network configurations began to emerge. Using the data collected from the 
name−generator method, we conducted an ego−centered network analysis that further confirmed 
such differences.  
Second, using axial coding to relate and contextualize the core categories, we re−assembled the 
qualitative data, related categories, and subcategories to derive richer and more precise explanations 
of the differences in the network configurations. To consolidate and systematically relate the 
categories, we constantly asked what, where, when, how, and why questions so that we could unpack 
the underlying institutional mechanisms.  
Third, using inductively derived constructs, we integrated and built our theory. With this step, 
we discovered that the varying nature of the regulative institutional environment and relational 
norms had different meanings for the early cohort and new cohort. Experiencing traditional Chinese 
relational norms and inconsistent regulative institutional development made network adaptation 
difficult and even unnecessary for the early cohort. However, the new cohort could better sense the 
regulative institutional development and adapt to the new relational norms and thus constructed their 
networks in new ways. We revisited the data multiple times to check for internal logic and 
consistency until we achieved a close match between our data and theory.  
Conceptualization and measurement  
We conceive of a network configuration as comprising three measures: network types, market 
network diversity, and tie strength. 
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Network types. The choice to use a particular network type in a particular institutional context 
reflects the degree of institutional uncertainty and level of resource munificence (Koka et al., 2006; 
Ma and Cheng, 2010). We identified three types of networks: (1) social−cultural, which features 
connections with family members, relatives, friends, and classmates who share common socio−
cultural backgrounds; (2) political, including connections with government officials and entities; 
and (3) market, which consists of connections with other market partners and entities. 
Tie strength. With measures suggested by Burt (1992) and Marsden and Campbell (1984), we 
coded tie strength as ‘strong’ when respondents mentioned frequent contact and close emotional 
attachment and as ‘weak’ otherwise. The quantitative data included frequency ratings on a 1–5 scale, 
which ranges from ‘several times a week,’ to ‘once a year or even less.’ Finally, the closeness rating 
also used a five−point scale, which ranges from ‘very close,’ to ‘distant.’  
Market network diversity. This measure describes how diverse the market networks are across 
different industries (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005). In our qualitative data, we coded ties concentrated 
within the same industry as homogeneous and those that spanned industry boundaries as diverse.  
DIFFERENCES IN NETWORK CONFIGURATION BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURIAL 
COHORTS 
 
In this section, we provide evidence of the differences in the network configurations of the two 
cohorts. Then we uncover the underlying institutional mechanisms that lead to such differences. 
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the network differences of the two cohorts, as we elaborate next.  
CA: network configuration during P1  
For the cohort of entrepreneurs that entered in the early stage of economic reform, social−cultural 
networks with family, relatives, and friends provided vital help at the initial business stage. However, 
those cohesive and strongly attached ties were limited in their access to critical resources and 
opportunities. To acquire physical and financial resources, make deals, and find business 
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opportunities, a majority of the respondents cultivated political networks (N = 9) and market 
networks (N = 12). These latter connections were mainly (8 of 12) established with buyers, suppliers, 
and peers in the same industry, using homogeneous ties.  
The data further reveal that respondents primarily established strong ties (see Table 1). They 
were often involved in social interactions (e.g., dining together, sending gifts, and visiting families) 
and developed emotional closeness to ‘strengthen the relationships’ with their political and market 
connections. During P1, the government controlled most critical resources, and officials had the 
power to allocate resources. Cultivating strong interpersonal relations with officials was a reliable 
way to establish strong ties. To reduce market uncertainties and transaction costs, as well as to gain 
privileged resources and opportunities, respondents formed strong ties with their market connections. 
As ZRQ pointed out, ‘I accumulated a deep friendship with them [market connections]. At least, 
they recognized me as a good friend.’  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
CA: network inertia during P2 
In P2, the importance of the social−cultural network decreased. Incumbent entrepreneurs (N = 9) 
still reported the high presence of political networks. Among them, some (N = 6) maintained their 
old political connections and some (N = 6) built new connections. The market network increased in 
importance (N = 15), though most (N = 11) of CA’s market connections remained nested inside 
homogenous networks. Respondents did not take proactive actions to search for or form new 
connections with a more diverse pool of market entities. Instead, they largely relied on their old 
market connections to bridge potential businesses connections.  
During P2, respondents still commonly established and maintained strong ties. For the great 
majority of respondents (8 of 9) with political connections, the ties were strong. Some (N = 3) 
respondents maintained their old political connections and engaged in symbolic interactions even 
 12
though those connections were not beneficial. The majority (10 of 15) of the respondents’ market 
networks featured strong ties. Telling examples included relational actions during tough times, such 
as during financial crises or market declines. These respondents expressed their willingness to 
endure hard times and overcome difficulties with their market ties. The ‘difficult times’ provided 
opportunities to test relational loyalties, and their market networks passed these tests because of 
their long−accumulated interpersonal trust during the institutional change.  
CB: network configuration during P2  
As Table 2 shows, compared to CA, a similar number of CB respondents (N = 10) used 
social−cultural networks, but alumni networks played a more important role than family members 
and relatives in pooling resources. Fewer (N = 6) entrepreneurs established political networks, and 
half of those reported that the government voluntarily connected and supported their business. 
Furthermore, more respondents (N = 9) reported that they did not need or attempt to establish 
political networks; because market resources and opportunities were more dynamic, they preferred 
to focus on strengthening their own capabilities and developing market networks.  
In contrast to CA’s strong and interpersonal networks, CB’ networks are featured with weak 
and inter−organizational ties. For example, realizing that his peer−to−peer broadcasting business 
ran the risk of copyright infringement, YX actively participated in projects of government agencies 
and worked towards alignment with industrial regulations. For his firm, organizational cooperation 
provided a good opportunity to promote the firm’s public image so that ‘we can make bold changes 
and innovations.’ The majority (N = 15) of CB members established market networks in an open 
environment, exploring diverse partners such as consulting firms, financial institutions, industrial 
associations, and the media, and establishing weak ties with them, which were more flexible and 
useful for acquiring resources, exploring opportunities, and obtaining legitimacy.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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Ego−centered network analysis  
In an ego−centered network analysis, we analyzed the total reported ties between entrepreneurs 
(egos) and their connections (alters). We illustrate the network configurations of the two cohorts 
with the ego−centered network visualization tool―Vennmaker, as shown in Figure 1. The analysis 
generally confirms the findings from the qualitative data. The first difference arises with regard to 
network type: For CA, the proportion of the social−cultural network decreased from P1 to P2 (from 
20% to 10.6%), but the proportions of market and political networks remained relatively stable (from 
53.3% to 61.7% and from 26.7% to 27.7%, respectively). In contrast, for CB, the market network 
(71.4%) significantly outweighed the social−cultural network (20%) and the political network 
(10.6%). In addition, for CA, almost half of the ties (22 of 47) during P2 were repeated ties, 
suggesting that CA to a great extent maintained old ties.  
Second, CB tended to establish weaker ties than CA. We used three measures to compare tie 
strength: the mean of emotional closeness (C), the mean of frequency (F) (Burt, 1992; Marsden and 
Campbell, 1984), and the mean of combining closeness and frequency (FC) (Reagans, Zuckerman, 
and McEvily, 2004). For CA, a paired−sample t−test using three measures consistently showed that 
the difference between P1 and P2 was not statistically significant (e.g., for FC, t (13) = −1.01, p 
= .33), such that CA maintained strong ties. Furthermore, the tie strength of CB was weaker than 
that of CA during P2 (e.g., for FC CB M = 2.15, SD = .50; CA M = 1.88, SD = .40), though this 
difference was not significant. Finally, the difference between CB during P2 and CA during P1 was 
significant in the tests of FC and F (e.g., for FC CB (P2): M = 2.15, SD = .50; CA (P1): M = 1.77, 
SD = .34; t (28) = −2.43, p = .02). This finding confirmed that CB established weaker ties in the 
founding period. 
Third, weak ties were more important for CB than CA. Adopting Gargiulo and Benassi’s (2000) 
grouping strategy, we categorized all ego–alter ties as strong or weak ties, depending on the mean 
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FC value. Weak (strong) ties are identified when FC values are above (below) the mean FC (M = 
1.93). By comparing the importance of the alters’ help (‘very important’ or ‘important’), we 
examined the function of weak ties. The results showed that during P2, among the ties that provided 
‘very important’ help, 56.5% belonged to weak ties for CB, compared with 46.4% and 37.5% for 
CA during P2 and P1, respectively. Thus, weak ties tended to be more important for CB than for CA.  
[Place Figure 1 about here] 
Overall, these results confirmed the findings of the qualitative analysis. An important point 
should be noted here though. Scholars generally use the name-generator method to examine personal 
networks. During our name−generator interviews, information on organizational networks emerged 
(especially from CB, because these respondents received more help from organizations than from 
individuals). Coding this information was challenging, because it was difficult to identify single 
individuals and measure their closeness. Therefore, we included this information in the qualitative 
data analysis, which may explain why the tie strength of CB was weaker than that of CA but not 
statistically significant. The qualitative and quantitative data validated each other and provided more 
accurate information about the network configurations of the two cohorts.  
 
UNPACKING THE MECHANISMS OF DIFFERENT NETWORK CONFIGURATIONS 
 
Our qualitative and quantitative analyses show that the early cohort of entrepreneurs exhibited a 
greater degree of network inertia, maintaining their strong tie–based political and market networks. 
On the other hand, the new cohort of entrepreneurs instead established fewer political networks and 
more diverse, weak-tie based market networks. To explain these outcomes, we analyze the 
mechanisms by which the regulative institutions and relational norms at founding shape 
entrepreneurs’ networking strategies and subsequent differences in network configurations. Tables 
3 and 4 provide definitions and examples of each mechanism. Figures 2 and 3 depict these 
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mechanisms visually. The environment at founding shapes entrepreneurs’ networking strategies 
through the effects of regulative institutions and relational norms. Different founding environments, 
in turn, yield different networking strategies. In the case of the early cohort, the founding 
environment contributed to a networking strategy characterized by network bonding and close 
coupling with traditional guanxi-based relational norms (Figure 2). In the case of the new cohort, 
the founding environment contributed to a networking strategy characterized by network releasing 
and decoupling from traditional guanxi-based relational norms (Figure 3). We discuss these 
mechanisms in more detail below.  
[Place Figure 2 and 3 about here] 
 
Cohort A 
Network bonding. Regulative institutions mainly shape the degree of dependence on networks and 
the availability and openness of network resources. The common problems that CA respondents 
confronted during the founding period were as follows: ‘policies were unstable and fluctuating,’ 
‘discrimination against private enterprises,’ ‘difficult to enter the market without the help of 
acquaintances,’ and so forth. The liability of newness was exacerbated for entrepreneurs operating 
in an unfavorable institutional environment with underdeveloped market conditions. This situation 
created strong dependence on networks and a limited choice of networking partners, because of 
inadequate resources and insufficient mobility in the market (table 3, mechanism 1). To reduce the 
uncertainties inherent in informal exchanges and avoid the risks of unwanted exposure, respondents 
tried to cultivate particularistic ties with government officials. After describing the difficulties in 
obtaining a bank loan, MM explained how he established such connection with an official to obtain 
one:  
At that time, no college students were doing business.... I told him that my parents were 
government officials as well. So he was a little bit relieved. And then he checked my 
background and found out that I had joined the party when I was in college, and that I had 
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been a student leader back then. This also increased his personal trust in me. After we 
became familiar with each other, the loan was approved…. There was no requirement of 
montage.  
  
Institutional uncertainty and inadequate market resource flows also bonded the respondents with 
their market connections (table 3, mechanism 2). To obtain critical resources and opportunities, 
respondents resorted to existing ties. Previous interactions with old business partners fostered trust 
and commitment, and when the respondents started their own businesses, the old ties provided 
timely help.   
Although forming ties with new partners can facilitate access to new resources and business 
opportunities, it requires much more effort. The CA members sought to deepen the relations to foster 
trust and commitment, as a relational bond to buffer against an uncertain environment and 
opportunistic behavior. An early IT services start−up, DHC confronted difficulties obtaining IT 
devices. Thus, he established strong ties with powerful market intermediaries who were engaged in 
overseas imports:  
If you didn’t follow them to get the goods, your enterprise couldn’t survive. However, in this 
manner, you faced high potential risks, such as smuggling. Under such conditions, 
establishing and maintaining guanxi was very important…. So I sent them some gifts and 
invited them to dinner so as to establish a closeness.  
 
Close coupling with traditional guanxi practices. An early unfavorable institutional environment 
bonded the early entrepreneurs with their specific ties and they deepened the ties to cultivate trust 
and commitment. In addition, this bonding relationship was consolidated by the relational pressures 
imposed by traditional guanxi practices. Most CA respondents (11 of 16) did not move in a more 
strategic direction; instead, they emphasized building and maintaining harmonious relationships and 
improving the quality of their existing ties. Their networking actions remained closely coupled with 
traditional guanxi routines, practices, and scripts. Respondents often deepened the relations through 
expressive interactions and social events, such as wining and dining. This echoes the idea that guanxi 
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building and consolidating involves mixing expressive interactions and instrumental ends (Chen and 
Chen, 2004; Hwang, 1987). In these conditions, actors need to insure an intricate balance to avoid 
incurring disapproval for being too instrumental. Doing business was a process of making friends 
that involved certain routines and etiquettes. As CFB described that, ‘After the meal, the order was 
naturally approved.’ 
Respondents also attached great importance to the accumulation of long−term relationships and 
nurturing mutual understanding, reciprocity, obligation, and assurance for continuous exchanges. As 
MM stated: 
I want to get myself accepted by them. When we are together, I show them my sincerity. After 
a long time, personal guanxi is well nurtured. And there might be many opportunities. These 
opportunities might not be related to business. You can’t be too instrumental because it is a 
long−term process.  
 
Subtle, informal relational norms and rules were established in specific exchange relationships. 
During P2, respondents conformed to these rules to secure trust and avoid disapproval from their 
old ties. For example, FPX was still doing business with a third party through an intermediary and 
never ‘crossed the line’ to connect with the business. He explained:  
I follow the rules of the game, I entered the market by this channel [a referral], I won’t break 
it … if you break it, you are not on the right track. Why would I do that just for some money?  
 
The data in Table 1 and 2 show that obtaining resources and discovering opportunities were the 
primary entrepreneurial processes during P1 and P2. Close coupling with traditional guanxi practices 
ensures commitment and facilitates access to resources and opportunities. However, it creates an 
imprinting effect that impedes adaptation to changing conditions. With these strong, pervasive 
relational pressures, deviant behavior can provoke strong disapproval, as DHC noted with regard to 
his unsuccessful attempt to operate his business without following intricate guanxi practices: 
Actually, one year ago I tried with a friend to operate a business based on a new model, 
hoping that we could break away from the guanxi practice and we could run the business 
according to the market. However, after actual practice, we found that it didn’t work. The 
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business still relied on guanxi…. If you don’t act in that way, it seems there is no way out. 
Maybe there is a way out, but not everyone can find it.  
We assessed the data to determine if new relational norms and schemas were diffused and equally 
perceived by the two cohorts during P2. The results instead showed that the new institutional 
environment offered different meanings for the two cohorts. Although CA members shared the 
feeling that ‘market competition is intensifying’ and that they need to ‘enhance their internal strength 
and market capabilities,’ these pressures did not necessarily motivate them to dissolve their old ties 
or forge new, diverse, weak ties. Being embedded in homogenous and cohesive networks restricted 
their awareness of the external institutional change and constrained their adaptation to the changing 
environment.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Experiencing inconsistent regulative institutional development. The prevailing theoretical 
explanation of network change is that during the institutional change in transitional economies, 
regulative institutions are improved and this improvement leads to network decline or strategizing 
(Guthrie, 1998; Hitt et al., 2004; Peng, 2003; Peng and Quan, 2009; Peng and Zhou, 2005). However, 
the environment is not purely exogenous and actors’ response is mediated by their experience and 
interpretation (Kaplan, 2011; Lawrence, Lorsch, and Garrison, 1967). CA’s evaluation of 
institutional change did not indicate a consistent picture that regulative institutions in P2 had become 
significantly more favorable than P1. Many respondents complained that during P2, ‘policies are 
constantly changing’ and ‘there are more regulations and restrictions.’ The early experience and 
unpleasant institutional journey reinforced their perceptions of uncertainty and amplified their 
emphasis on strong ties with officials as a way to protect themselves against uncertainties.  
Respondents also noted that during institutional change, market institutions and mechanisms 
were developing, accompanied by intensifying competition and uncertainties. The informal market 
connections still provided some reliability and predictability in business exchanges. When 
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confronted with environmental turbulence and business challenges, the respondents remained close 
and endured the challenges together. Some respondents even realized that their businesses were 
stagnating or declining, but they remained with their old ties and continued existing business 
collaborations. They did not attempt to search for and form new ties with buyers, suppliers, and 
customers who they did not know before but may potentially offer new business resources and 
opportunities. As ZRQ remarked:  
If there is an opportunity [to find new partners], I will probably try, but I won’t try very hard 
to do that…. I feel very comfortable doing business with my old partners. There aren’t so 
many conflicts. After all, we know each other very well. 
 
For most CA members, maintaining and establishing interpersonal networks was still a favorable 
option, and it became an anchored, consistently reused coping strategy during periods of institutional 
change.  
Cohort B 
Network releasing. Compared with CA’s unpleasant institutional journey, the exposure to relatively 
favorable regulative institutions moderated CB’s dependence on networks and increased the 
opportunities for networking (table 4, mechanisms 1-3). Thus CB’s general perceptions included the 
following: ‘regulations are relaxed,’ ‘more supportive policies,’ and ‘less bureaucracy and more 
efficiency.’ Beginning in 1998, the Chinese government accelerated its market economy and 
launched reform measures to improve bureaucratic capacity (Pearson, 2007). The resources and 
opportunities controlled and distributed by the government were gradually diminished. Meanwhile, 
the Shanghai government started providing more support to new ventures. These reforms and policy 
supports had a selective effect: the new entrepreneurial cohort enjoyed more benefits than the pre-
existing one. Technology−related entrepreneurs reported that government agencies were directly 
involved in pooling funds, channeling resources, and providing administrative support. Others were 
actively connected by the government to boost the local economy. For example, JXJ explained how 
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his venture was supported by government agencies:  
There are many [supports]. The local government and the center for the transformation of 
high−tech production. They are constantly helping us. I will move to a new office soon. This 
office is offered by the Yangpu Start−up Center…. It even found some projects and came to 
support me…. The college students’ innovation funds, technology venture capital, various 
start−up centers, etc. are all well connected and supportive.  
 
The development of market institutions and mechanisms also increased the volume and speed 
of resource flows, providing CB respondents with an open networking environment. Respondents 
clearly perceived competition, but they regarded it as a natural process for business ventures and 
tried to leverage their resources and opportunities, including external funding, talent, knowledge, 
and joint projects, with diverse market connections. Many respondents searched for and identified 
their new network partners by spotting complementary needs and then contacting them with a ‘cold 
call.’ The open networking environment encouraged resource sharing and fast network bridging. 
Respondents were connected to third parties through their network partners, with whom they 
accessed and exchanged resources and information. As WB explained:  
When I know some other companies are providing personal financial services, I call them 
directly. They also have such needs, so they won’t refuse me if I go after them.… It is a very 
equal relationship.  
 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Decoupling from or loose coupling with traditional guanxi practices. The sharp contrasts in the two 
cohorts’ network configurations call for a close investigation of the relational norms: Are the two 
cohorts subject to different relational norms, even during the same institutional period (P2)? The 
data show that when networking, CB members tended to decouple from the traditional guanxi 
practices. They perceived the routines, scripts, and schemas ingrained in guanxi building to be 
complicated, costly, and inefficient. Thus CB members were less engaged in social expressive 
interactions than CA members, but they were more engaged in task−oriented interactions. Many 
business and joint projects were negotiated and established within their offices. In this sense, ZAM 
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described problems with traditional guanxi practices:  
Many things important in Chinese business traditions, such as tactics, mianzi, and guanxi 
are not meaningful. How to build and how to manipulate are too complicated. I would prefer 
transparent market operations and cooperation based on trust.  
 
New entrepreneurs also decoupled from the traditional guanxi norms and values by avoiding 
mixing business relationships with friendship and attaching less affective elements. As ZQ remarked: 
‘Very few business relations can be transformed into friendships.’ YYB noted that he repositioned 
his relationship with a previous friend and decided to cooperate with the latter only after he had 
identified the economic benefits from the cooperation. 
Loose coupling became a key strategy when respondents perceived traditional relational pressure 
but did not want to follow them. For example, NXD allowed his subordinate to build interpersonal 
relationships with government officials, while he focused on enhancing the firm’s competence and 
developing a strategic alliance with international partners. Loose coupling generates flexible roles, 
secures appropriateness, and facilitates efficiency.  
Coupling with new relational norms. The acceleration of marketization and integration of Shanghai 
into the global economy facilitated the diffusion of new norms for networking and cooperation. The 
need to strengthen market capabilities and competencies became dominant beliefs and values 
internalized by CB members when they entered the market. Emphasizing business innovation and 
value creation were the primary ways to form ties. For example, YMP offered elite education courses 
for ‘smart kids’ at a very high price. He attracted market partners by differentiating his business 
from others’ and stressing the additional values his firm could bring to the customers.   
Obtaining organizational legitimacy is an important entrepreneurial process for new start−ups 
(Table 2). For example, YYB began his catering business in a traditional industry, but in comparing 
his practice with those of his industrial peers, he asserted that participating in a well−known national 
television program would be a more effective way to promote the business:  
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I don’t rely on interpersonal guanxi networks because they are limited. Today, more and more 
people get to know your business via websites and media. This is why I value the media; it 
plays an important role in networking. I think in this new era, one needs some breakthrough 
thinking. 
CB respondents tried to establish networks with prominent and powerful players to signal that 
they abided by social and institutional expectations. Once they established strategic alliances with 
powerful players, new start−ups could use their relational legitimacy to attract potential partners and 
expand their networks. For example, ZQ strategically allied with a high−status firm and invited the 
director to become a partner. After this alliance, ZQ found it was very easy to obtain financial 
support from banks. This coupling of new relational norms was well summarized by YZD:  
Obviously, Shanghai has become a center where business rules have become more and more 
international; now you have to flow with the rules of the game. In establishing a network, 
our own capabilities are very important. I try to be selective in establishing ties because we 
must match resources; time and energy are limited, and one needs to find the right partners. 
 
As these new norms, values, and beliefs became internalized, CB members viewed 
environmental shocks as a chance to reflect and strengthen firm competence, and viewed it more 
neutrally and objectively, detaching it from personal relationships. The firms in which ZAM’s 
company had invested lost value during the crisis; some of the early investors withdrew capital from 
his firm. Confronting these downturns and tie dissolutions, he remarked:  
Every crisis is a process of baptizing. After the crisis, the firms that remain in the market are 
the good firms. The market has baptized them. We feel reassured when we choose such firms.  
 
This analysis suggests that the new scripts, schemas, and norms were not equally perceived by 
the two cohorts. In contrast with CA’s response, CB members perceived needs to enhance their 
market capability, engage in instrumental interactions, and broaden and strategize their networks.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
This study examines the adaptive responses of two cohorts of entrepreneurs that founded their 
businesses at two different stages of China’s institutional transition. Despite scattered insights from 
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the existing literature, the question of how early and late entrants adapt to the changing institutional 
environment remains ambiguous. Building on Romanelli and Tushman (1986)’s conceptual 
framework for studying organizations’ adaption to the changing environment, we employ a 
comparative entrepreneurial cohort approach to investigate entrepreneurs’ network adaptation 
during China’s market-oriented institutional change since 1992. Both qualitative and quantitative 
data confirm the distinctive network configurations between the early and late cohorts.  
We find that the cohort founded in the early stage of institutional reform exhibits a great degree 
of network inertia, whereas the recently founded cohort exhibits more adaptation to the new 
institutional environment. Exposure to unfavorable regulative institutions required early 
entrepreneurs to establish strong interpersonal trust to reduce transaction cost and risks. This effect 
was reinforced when they confronted deep-entrenched guanxi practices that emphasize emotional 
closeness, strong commitment, and long-term orientation. This network-deepening orientation 
imprinted by early founding institutional conditions created a strong tendency toward network 
inertia and made the early cohort’s adaptation difficult. However, when a later cohort of 
entrepreneurs entered the market during the new institutional period, they enact “fit by founding” 
(Peli, 2009). The more favorable regulative institutions, along with new relational norms, values, 
and beliefs, contributed to network-broadening. New entrepreneurs proactively developed new and 
diverse market connections. They tended to distance themselves from conventional ways of 
networking, but emphasized creating business value for partners and used relational legitimacy to 
attract and expand their networks, leading to a distinctive network configuration.  
Implications  
An implication of our findings is that within in the same institutional period, different cohorts 
of entrepreneurs may cope differently with current regulative institutions and relational norms as a 
result of their different founding conditions. Prior research on imprinting has found that newly 
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established firms emulate the template of firms established in earlier eras with different 
environmental conditions (Marquis, 2003). We extend this research by showing that entrepreneurs 
may exhibit two different responses to environmental change. Entrepreneurs from the early stage of 
institutional transition tend towards network deepening, which acts to preserve the network 
structures of the past, while entrepreneurs from the late stage of transition tend towards network 
broadening, which contribute to changes in network structure. Our findings speak to recent questions 
about how organizations “confront incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics” 
(Greenwood et al., 2011: 318) and how organizations respond to this complexity (Marquis and 
Tilcsik, 2013). Entrepreneurs in changing environments are likely to experience the coexistence of 
multiple incompatible logics (e.g., inconsistent regulative institutional development, traditional 
versus new relational norms) during institutional transition. Our findings suggest that imprinting 
from different founding conditions may help to explain differences in how entrepreneurs cope with 
competing institutional logics.  
An empirical contribution of our study is documenting different trends in network configuration 
between different cohorts of entrepreneurs in China. Previous research has shown that Chinese firms 
and entrepreneurs, including new entrants, actively cultivate guanxi with government officials (Li 
and Zhang, 2007). We find that compared to entrepreneurs that started earlier, more recent 
entrepreneurs establish fewer political networks, and the direction has shifted from primarily 
attempting to network with government officials to managing networking behavior from 
government officials. We also find cohort differences in the structure of market networks. Scholars 
have suggested that as the institutional environment in China changes, firms and entrepreneurs 
should be expected to transform their strong tie–based networks into weak tie–based ones and 
diversify their connections (Peng and Quan, 2009; Peng and Zhou, 2005; Tan, Yang and Veliyath, 
2009). Our findings show, however, that recent entrepreneurs are more likely to make such shifts in 
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their networking strategies than entrepreneurs that started in the early stages of transition. Our study 
therefore speaks to the literature regarding whether closed networks would move toward more open 
network exchanges in transitional economies (Cook, Rice, and Gerbasi, 2004). Taking China as the 
research site, Marquis and Qian (2014) show that because of the ‘socialist imprint,’ old firms are 
less likely than younger firms to pursue recent trends and management ideas around corporate social 
responsibility. We similarly find that the legacy of early socialist imprinting (Kogut and Zander, 
2000; Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006), together with traditional guanxi norms, seem to confine strategic 
adaptation. Our findings therefore suggest that strategic adaptation in transitional economies is more 
likely to occur through the succession of organizational and entrepreneurial cohorts than by adaption 
among incumbents.  
Finally, our study offers insights more broadly for the understanding of networks and 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs face the need for legitimacy and access to resources and 
opportunities. Indeed, our findings show that entrepreneurship in the early stages of China’s 
transition—when the need for resources and opportunities was highest—was facilitated by strong 
interpersonal ties. But while valuable for establishing interpersonal trust, guanxi is nevertheless by 
its very nature ill-suited for transferring resources beyond close interpersonal ties (Chen and Chen, 
2009). Research has therefore argued that entrepreneurs in transition economies are likely to benefit 
from going beyond particularistic ties to develop new business connections (Peng, 2004; Tan, Yang 
and Veliyath, 2009). As access to diverse information and entities becomes more important, close 
guanxi networks are likely to become constraints. Our study contributes to prior observations about 
negative externalities of close guanxi networks (Chen and Chen, 2009) by showing that 
entrepreneurs do not passively suffer the constraints of their past network structures but reinforce 
these effects through their own network-deepening actions. We also show that this behavior can be 
traced to imprinting from entrepreneurs’ founding environments. These findings contribute to 
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understanding the mechanisms by which networks can facilitate or constrain entrepreneurship.  
Further research 
Our study suggests several fruitful directions of future research. First, since our study mainly 
focuses on processes and mechanisms of how the institutional environment shapes networking 
actions and network configurations, we did not explicitly include quantitative performance measures. 
Future research could examine how certain network configurations might be beneficial or 
detrimental for firm performance. Although extant literature has shown that network inertia 
constrains firms and entrepreneurs from developing new diverse ties and negatively affecting 
performance (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Koka and Prescott, 2008), we suggest that the impact on 
performance might be contingent on founding conditions and venture stage. Second, given that 
longitudinal data on networks for a period of more than two decades are difficult to obtain, we 
collected retrospective data in this study. We took certain measures to ensure accuracy, including 
rigorous interview techniques and triangulating using qualitative and quantitative data. Yet, our 
findings should be interpreted with caution since a retrospective bias still may exist. This study 
provides grounds for future validation when new and better data become available. Similarly, future 
research may draw from alternative methods such as simulation to overcome data limitation and 
reveal the changes over time (Tan, Zhang and Wang, in press). Finally, we examined only networks 
of the new entrepreneurial cohort during the contemporary institutional period. Future research 
could examine how the networks of the new cohort evolve over time, especially how individual firm 
level networking strategies interact and co-evolve with network level characteristics during the 
economics transition (Tan, Zhang and Wang, in press; Tan and Tan, 2005). 
Conclusion 
This study represents an early effort to examine the adaptive responses of two entrepreneurial 
cohorts during the course of China’ institutional transition. The qualitative and quantitative analyses 
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show that the cohort that entered during the early stage of transition exhibited a greater degree of 
network inertia, whereas the new cohort exhibited quick adaptation to the new institutional 
environment and a distinctive network configuration. By unpacking the underlying institutional 
mechanism, this article enriches our understanding of how interests and agency are shaped and 
reshaped when actors confront multiple institutional logics. By raising new questions, we hope this 
study will serve as a ground for future investigations dealing with the strategic actions of different 
entrepreneurial and organizational cohorts that are largely neglected in previous studies. 
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Table 1. Cohort A: network configuration during the period of institutional change (P1 and P2)  




 (P2)  
Examplesa 
(P2) 




6/6/7 At the beginning, the bank loan was very difficult to get. So I borrowed 
the money from relatives....I worked in the government for three 
years. They [officials] thought I was young, very hardworking and 
close to them....So they gave the printing department to me, and then 
I started up my business. (CCL)  
5/5/3 You need to actively contact the government and leaders, letting them know what 
you are doing. Then you could get their support, such as policy, business and 





6/7/3 At that time, I tried to help many people and solve their technical 
problems. I didn't ask for any rewards. But they gave me the orders 
once they had the business. Actually, this was how I developed this 
market model. (ZRQ) 
7/14/3 Market development is mainly based on the previous model: for example, the 
previous accumulated customers and guanxi. I also asked them to recommend 
some new customers. Business becomes easier and faster in this way because we 





2/2/0 When you do the things the government encourages you to do, it will 
give you certain support...Sometimes, government [officials] are 
very busy and they can't take care of you. In such a case, you need to 
actively contact them. Let them know what you are doing. (YJ) 
3/2/0 Many government officials want to visit our firm. The deputy major visited us last 
year. It's zero−cost advertisement. The government needs to investigate the 
situation [of firms], and they need to find good models. (XJF) 
Political network 9  9  
Strong/weak b  9/2c When I worked in a State−owned enterprise, I tried my best to become 
familiar with the people from the government. It was helpful for 
mutual understanding. When I started up my own business, they gave 
the business to me. (HDS) 
8/2c Because we have emotional exchanges, our personal relationship is built very well. 
Many things have been mixed together; and we stay in contact very frequently. 
(CFB) 
Market network  12  15  
 Strong/weak b  9/4c I heavily relied on friends, they are relatively reliable.... I always invited 
them to have meal at my home...I am very grateful for their help. 
(WM) 
10/6c After long term, it becomes friendship. Business just needs a simple call....I think I 
can develop guanxi in any environment. Having a chat over tee and cherishing 
the kindred spirit. The business will come naturally. This seems very important in 
China. (HDS) 
 Homogeneous/diverseb 8/4 At that time, I had very good relationships with industrial peers. We 
dined together and talked about the business....I relied on them. 
Actually, the circle was not big. (XJF) 
11/4 There are some professional training companies, offering consulting in sales and 
organizational behaviors....However, our company is small. To be honest, we can't 
afford it. So we grope about and exchange with industrial peers. We share the 
same problems and they too also don't know how to deal with them. (DHC)  
Social−cultural network 
Strongb 
10 I recruited two people [in my team]. One was recommended by a friend. 
I post the information in the job market, but I thought friend's 
recommendation was more suitable. Another recruit was my brother 
colleague. He was our hometown fellow and we already knew each. 
(DHC) 
6 At the beginning, my wife and relatives also worked in the firm. In the later stage, I 
asked them don't work here anymore. We disagree on something. (ZRQ) 
a The figure indicates the number of interviews (out of 16) in which the interviewee indicated the coding themes. Examples are illustrated for the main pattern in each theme. For example, in ‘obtaining 
resources,’ we provide the example of social−cultural networks because 7 respondents noted this pattern.  
b Referring to the measures of tie strength (Marsden and Campbell, 1984), we coded them as strong when respondents mentioned frequent contact and emotional closeness and weak otherwise. Diversity 
describes how diverse the market networks were (i.e., number of unique partners) across different industries (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005). We coded ties concentrated within same industry as homogeneous 
and diverse otherwise.  
c The sum of the ties exceeding the number of interviewees noted in the coding theme indicates a mix of strong and weak ties.
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Table 2. Cohort B: network configurations in the contemporary institutional period (P2) 





7/12/8 Our firm is a technology supplier. We cooperate with consulting firms. They offer some advices, such as 
marketing strategies. We also go directly to the potential customers and know their demands. So we can 




Social cultural  
2/13/2 To develop the project, one approach is through our own research, or through our own partners' network. 
Another approach is through the professional agencies. Local governments also actively introduce some 





3/6/1 I think the business model and market is not mature. I want to improve the market acceptance. So I went to IT 
firms and high−tech firms because there are many singles....I also collected and integrated the resources: 
people and gatherings. For example, cooperating with Baihe. net and other firms and opening a salon in 
Jinmao Tower, letting people know the marriage consulting service. (HDT) 
Political network 6  
Strong/weakb  2/4 It's very difficult to obtain the land in Shanghai. It took us two years to study the market situation and we 
didn't make any contact with government. We just did it through the market and we got the land via bidding. 
After that, we communicate with the local government. They were surprised....We didn't get close to the 
government. I think it is the proper work relationship with the government. (ZQ) 
Market network  17  
Strong/weakb  6/15c Just as the cooperation with Beihe.net. From the beginning, we don't have any contact. But I think we can 
work together. So I made a cold call to ask if they also had such an intention. Then I visited their firm and 
discussed the business project. (WY).  
Homogeneous/diverseb 2/15 Start−ups must manage four things: technology, capital, talents, and the market. You can’t stay in your circle, 
you must jump out to find those things….Those things are out there, they are not scarce. You need to deal 
with different persons, being active and selective, you will find those resource and opportunities.(YX) 
Social−cultural network 
Strongb 
10 I co−started up with a former colleague, a classmate from MBA school. I think our team is very stable because 
of our firm friendship. (DHY)  
a The figure indicates the number of interviews (of 17) in which the interviewee indicated the coding themes. Examples are illustrated for the main 
pattern in each theme. 
b We coded respondents who mentioned frequent contact and emotional closeness as strong and others as weak. We coded ties as homogeneous if 
they were concentrated within the same industry and diverse otherwise.  



































                       




a  In ego−centered network analysis, tie strength is measured by the mean of the product of the frequency of communication and emotional 
closeness (FC) (Reagans et al., 2004). Frequency is rated on a scale of “several times a week,” “several times a month,” “several times a quarter,” 
“several times a year,” and “once a year or even less” (1−5) . Closeness is rated on a scale of “very close,” “close,”  “so−so,” “not so close,” and 
“distant” (1−5) (Burt, 1992: 125; Marsden and Campbell, 1984). Five circles (outward) indicate the tie strength from 1−5.   
b CA: N=14, total reported ties: CA (P1) =60, CA (P2) =47. CB: N=16, total reported ties CB (P2) =70.    represents alter, ☆ represents repeated 






















Table 3. Not fit by adaptation: the underlying mechanisms of network inertia of Cohort A 
Mechanisms Evidence Examples 
1. The weak regulative institutional 
support and underdeveloped state 
of the market create start−ups' 
strong dependence on network. 
12 In the early stage [before 2002], all electronic products were imported from abroad, mainly via gray 
channel like intermediaries.... If you didn't work in this way, you couldn't survive. In our IT circle, 
everybody knew it. You can say it was an open secret or an unspoken rule; you had no choice, but 
that was the situations. (DHC) 
2. The weak regulative institutional 
support and underdeveloped state 
of market limit the network 
opportunities and bond the 




He gave me the [government]projects because he trusted me. He would have worried if he gave them 
to anyone else...I manage my business within a controllable scope: it is relatively small and there 
are no problems. If I want to develop, there will be a problem. (HDS) 
The bosses from those companies were very brave. Actually they all had some backgrounds and they 
could solve the problems [import limitation]. However, I could not because I had no background 
and no resources. So I had to obtain the goods from them. (DHC) 
3. Close coupling with traditional 







4. Experiencing inconsistent 
regulative institutional 
development anchors guanxi
network as a coping strategy 










Under China’s macro conditions, business relies on guanxi. As a start−up, if you don’t develop your 
guanxi, you might be thought of as incapable of doing so. This applies to everyone. Guanxi requires 
long−term cultivation. (HDS) 
I show my enthusiasm and honesty and that I could do solid work. I have some clients who initially 
were not familiar with me. Eventually, they accepted me and trusted me. Slowly I developed 
guanxi....Actually, there is old Chinese saying: spur with long accumulation. Only by steady 
accumulation will people trust you.(DHC)  
 
[After 2002] The policies became much tighter: for example, customs, taxes and the administration 
etc. From the perspective of the state, they became more standardized; however, the business became 
more difficult....Many things are parasitic appendages of the state system. If you still have old guanxi 
networks, they can still help you sometimes. (DHC)  
    
a The figure indicates the number of interviews (of 16) in which the interviewee mentioned the theme. 
 
 
Table 4. Fit by adaptation: the underlying mechanisms of network adaptation of Cohort B 
Mechanisms Evidence Examples 
1. The relatively favorable regulative 
institutions and development of the 
market moderate network 
dependence on certain ties.  
16 State policies are more open and favorable to private enterprises. This expands the area of 
entrepreneurship. Earlier [After 2002], entering some high−ended field was difficult; now it is 
not that difficult....We are relying less on government connections, and it is a relatively pure 
market behavior. (WB) 
2. Regulative institutional support 
creates more network opportunities 
with government entities. 
6 You need to cooperate with the government in some activities....For the government, it is its 
political achievements. For us, it is an opportunity to improve our public image....We went out 
[to the public] to help the Zhangjiang government. The Zhangjiang government also helped 
us....It was a reciprocal process. (YX) 
 
3. The development of market 
institutions and mechanisms creates 
more network opportunities with 
market entities. 
15 In the Intent industry, actually everyone has more or less contact with one another. We know that 
in the new economy, only cooperation can create opportunities. You come to me and I go to you. 
So I think in the IT industry, you can find everyone by three to four degrees. (YX) 
 
4. Decoupling from or loose coupling 
with the traditional relational norms 
facilitate the departure from 
traditional guanxi practices.  
11 I think our [entrepreneurial] generation puts more emphasis on the market than on traditional 
guanxi. It [guanxi] requires much time and energy. That [elder] generation relies on guanxi for 
some certain reasons. But for us, capability is more important. (WB) 
 
5. Coupling with new relational norms 
facilitates new networking 
behaviors. 
12 At the beginning, we had no talent, no market, and no capital. However, we became accepted by 
venture capital because of our technology.... I then accumulated the users and reputation with 
the financial support from venture capital, then I negotiated with the content providers, and the 
chances [of cooperation] became greater. (YX) 















 Close coupling with traditional guanxi practices
Initial network configuration 
(P1)
 Political ties
 Homogenous market  ties
 Strong ties 
Network deepening
 Close coupling with traditional guanxi practices
 Consolidating existing ties and using them to bridge new ties
Current institutional 
environment (P2)
 Perceiving pressures from traditional guanxi norms, values, and rules
 Experiencing inconsistent regulative institutional development
Network inertia (P2)
 Stick to existing political and market ties
 Homogenous market ties 
 Strong ties
Entrepreneurial process
 Obtain resources and opportunities
 Obtain legitimacy
Figure 2. A model of process and mechanism underlying “not fit by adaptation”
 Unfavorable regulative institutions











 Relatively favorable regulative institutions
 New relational norms emphasize capability and value creation
Networking broadening
 Network releasing
 Decoupling from and loose coupling with traditional 
guanxi practices
 Coupling with new relational norms
Initial network configuration 
(P2)
 Less political ties
 Diverse market  ties
 Weak ties 
Entrepreneurial process
 Obtain legitimacy
 Obtain resources and  
opportunities 
Figure 3. A Model of process and mechanism underlying “fit by founding”
